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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10997 
This is an action brought against the State of Utah, 
t1H• f.;tate Road Commission, the individual members 
therf~of, and others to enjoin them from building a fence 
and a guardrail across a public right-of-way in front 
of and adjoining appellants' residence in a ma'.Tlner which 
interferes with and restriets the appellants' right of 
ingress and egress to and from their property so as 
to constitute a taking of their property. This action 
is brought pursuant to Article 1, Section 22, Article 1 
Section 7, and Article 1 Section 11 of the Utah Consti-
tntion and pursuant to the 14th amendment to the Con-
1 
stituhon of OH' Fnitrd States to recover compensation 
for thP taking and damaging without Que process of law 
of private propt>rty belonging to the appellants. 
DTSP08l'l'ION JN THE LOWER COURT 
Aft<'r th0 Complaint was filed, the respondents State 
of litah, d al, made a motion to dismiss the Complaint 
on the grounds that it failed to state a cause of action. 
rl'his motion was arg1wd before the Honorable Thornley 
K. Swan, J udgP of thP District Court for Davis County 
on Dec0mber 8, 1964. Nearly three years thereafter, on 
July 1-l-, 1967, and pnnmant to an alternative Writ of 
Mandamus from the Supreme Court, Judge Swan en-
tered a ruling dismissing the Complaint on the merits, 
and with pn'.'judice. 
RELIF:F SOUGH'l1 ON APPEAL 
The Appellants seek to reverse the ruling of the 
said Thornley K. Swan and to remand this matter for 
trial where all the evidence bearing on these issues can 
he presentf'd. 
STArrrnMENT OF FACTS 
The appellants arc the owners of certain real prop-
t>rty together with a house and other improvements lo-
<'ated thereon in the City of Clearfield, County of Davis, 
State of Utah, and described more particularly as fol-
lows: 
All of Lot 19, TERRACE VIEW SUBDIVI-
RION, a part of Section 1, Township 4 North, 
Range 2 'Vest, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, in 
the City of Clearfield, County of Davis, State 
of Utah, according to the official plat thereof. 
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r11he Appellants have owned and possessed thefr said 
property since August, 1959, and since that time have 
Pnjoyed the peaceable possession of said property. 
On or about October, 1963, the respondents, with 
the exception of the American Fence Company of Ogden, 
lwgan to construct Interstate 15 as a public highway im-
uwdiately adjacent to the property above described and 
upon 300 North Street, a public road running East and 
\Vest in front of appellants' property and in which they 
had an Pstablished property right. The Respondents did 
not comnwnce any condemnation proceedings as to these 
Appellants. 
The construction activities were performed by the 
respondents in a negligent, careless, and reckless man-
ner, and in complete disregard of the rights of the appel-
lants as owners of the private property herein above 
dt>scribed, and further have been performed in a manner 
·which amounts to a direct taking of appellants' property 
rights in 300 North Street and a substantial injury and 
damage to the remaining property not actually taken. 
1~he Complaint alleges special harm and injury to the 
appellants herein not shared by other members of the 
community and in a manner which will not promote 
the greatest public good. It is alleged this negligent 
('Onstruction has proximately damaged the appellant's 
11ro1wrty by vibration caused by equipment operation, 
from excessive amounts of dust which have been de-
posited on their property, from excessive noise, by caus-
ing cracking in the 'valls and ceilings of the Appellants' 
honw, and for other reasons, all of which have substan-
3 
hallv and materiallv inh~rfered with the peaceable use . . 
and possession of their property, and all of which have 
depreciatPd the fair rnarkd value of their property. As 
a sole, direct and proximate cause thereof, the appellants 
elaim damages in the amount of $6,000. 
In addition to these negligent design and construc-
tion activiti<'S, the appdlants allege a direct taking of 
their pro1wrty rights in 300 North Street and a substan-
tial damage to the remainder of their property not actu-
al l.'- taken. Tlw appellants allege that in 1959 they con-
~trneted a driveway onto their property, which driveway, 
togetliH with 300 North Street [a public road in the 
center of Clearfield, which runs directly in front of 
the Plaintiffs' property] jointly provided the only means 
of access to the property. Since 1959, the appellants had 
n~ed ~-mo North Street in both easterly and westerl.'' 
directions as a means of access to their property and did 
therPby acquire a snhtantial property right in the said 
street. 
HowPYPr, after the construction activities on Inter-
state 15 were commenced and respondents erected a 
fence across the entire distance of said 300 North 
Street in front of Appellants' property and further 
erected a guard railing across said street a few feet 
from said fence and further excavated 300 North Street 
easterly from said fence. rrhis action was done in an 
arhitrar~-, ear<>l<·;;;~, 1wgligP11t, and recklPss manner and 
in complete disregm·d of the rights of the Appellants. 
As a sole, proximatP, and direct result of this action 
by the Respondent, tl1e Appellants now find that it is 
impossible to use 300 North ~treet as a means of access 
4 
to their property, and they further allege that there has 
heen a substantial interference with the right of ingress 
and egress to and from their property and they claim 
this action constitutes a taking of and damage of their 
property rights for which they should be compensated 
1rnrsnant to the Constitutional provisions set forth above. 
Th~~ State of Utah, et al, admitted the taking and 
damaging of the easement and property rights of the 
Appellants and have offered to rebuild and realign their 
driveway so as to provide ingress and egress to the said 
property. This proposal was rejected by Appellants on 
tlw grounds that it would materially and adversely dam-
aw~ thrir property by lovl'ering the fair market value 
thereof. 
The Appellants submitted a written claim in the 
amonnt of $8,000 to the respondent, Utah Department 
of Highways, in December, 19.63. This claim was re-
;jected on August 20, 1964, by the said Department of 
highways acting through its authorized agent, Llewellyn 
0. Thomas. 
After the claim was rejected by the State of High-
wa~'S, the Appellants commenced the instant action on 
or about October, 1964. The Complaint herein sets forth 
the foregoing facts, and is by reference incorporated 
herein and made a part hereof at this time. 
At the time of filing the Complaint, the Honorable 
Thornley K. Swan issued an order directing the Re-
spondents, State of Utah, et al, to appear before his 
Court on November 16, 1964, then and there to show 
cause why a preliminary injunction should not be entered 
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against tlH·rn and why they should not remove the fence 
and gnardrail across 300 North Street so as to restore 
to the Ap1wllants their property rights, or in the alterna-
tive, why the Respondents should not be ordered to com-
J11encc condemnation proceedings pursuant to Article 1 
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
Aftt>r thP issuance of the said Order to Show Cause, 
the Re>spondt>nts filPd a motion to dismiss the Complaint 
on the grounds that it failed to state a cause of action. 
Tlw said motion was set for hearing on November 17, 
19G4, hnt was continued by request of the Respondenfs 
counsel nntil Derernber 8, 1964. 
On Decemlwr 8, 1964, the said motion was argued 
and thereafter a minute entry was entered in the official 
rPcord as follows: 
"This matter comes before the court for hearing 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Order to Show 
Cause, with James A. Mcintosh, Esq., appearing 
as counsel for Plaintiffs, and Joseph S. Knowlton. 
Esq., as counsel for Defendants. Motion to Dis-
miss is argued by counsel, and the matter is takt•n 
under advismnent." 
AftPr said Dt>cPrnher 8, 1964, the said Thornley K. 
Swan faih•d, n~fusPd, and neglected to enter his decision 
upon the saicl :Motion to Dismiss notwithstanding re-
peated rfforts h~· eonnsPl to have the said motion decided. 
Finally, on or ahont .T uly 5, 1967, the appellants filed 
a iwtition for a \Yrit of Mandamus in the Supreme Court 
of the Stat(' of l~tal1, [Cas<· No. 10963] requesting that 
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the Supreme Court require the said Thornley K. Swan 
to decide the said Motion to Dismiss. 
Pursuant thereto, the Supreme Court issued an al-
ternative Writ of Mandamus requiring the said Thornley 
K. Rwan to enter his decision on this matter by July 17, 
1 ~.JG7, or appear hefore the Supreme Court to Show Cause 
why he should not decide the said Motion. 
'rhereafter, the said Thornley K. Swan called coun-
sel for hoth parties and asked them to appear in his 
Court for another hearing on this matter. This hearing 
was held on July 14, 1967, at which time the parties 
n~argned their respective position. Thereafter, the Court 
<·ntered its ruling dismising the Complaint. No cases 
were cited by the Court nor were any findings of fact 
or conclusions of law entered. 
On August to, 1967, the Appellants filed their Notice 
of Appeal to this court. 
'J1he only issue in this case is whether the State of 
Utah, by and through its Road Commission, Department 
of Highways, and individual members thereof, have the 
constitutional right to take and/or damage private prop-
<•rty of the Appellants herein without due process of law. 
If a motion to dismiss is upheld under the circumstances 
set forth in the Complaint, the Appellants are denied 
a trial on the issues herein and their property is subject 
to a taking and to substantial damage without due process 
of law. 
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POINT I 
BY ERECTING A FENCE AND GUARDRAIL ACROSS 
300 NORTH STREET IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO 
SUBSTANTIALLY INTERFERE WITH THE APPEL-
LANTS' USE OF SAID STREET AS A MEANS OF 
INGRESS AND EGRESS TO AND FROM THEIR 
PROPERTY, THE RESPONDENTS HAVE TAKEN 
THE APPELLANTS' PROPERTY WITHOUT A 
HEARING AND WITHOUT PAYING JUST COM-
PENSATION AS REQUIRED BY THE 14th AMEND-
MENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AND AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE I SECTION 22 
AND ARTICLE I SECTION 11 OF THE UT AH 
CONSTITUTION. 
A. ~1 Motion to Dismi0s admits the truth of all the 
allegations in the Complliint: 'l1he Motion to Dismiss 
was filed by the State of Utah; Utah State Road Com-
mission; Ernest H. Balch; Elias J. Strong; Franchis 
Fr Heh; ,Y .• T. Srnirl; Ames K. Bagley; Utah 8tate De-
partment of Hig]nyays; C. Taylor Burton. The other 
Defendants are not involved in this appeal. The moving 
parties ar(:' all part of tlH• administrative hierarchy of 
thP State of rtah through the State Road Commission 
and the Department of Highways. Judge Swan ruled 
that tht· eomplnint fai [,•d to state a carnw of action as to 
these respond<~nts. 
NonP of tJ1p :mid respondents offered any exhibits, 
affidavits, depositions, or other evidence at any of the 
livarings on tlte sai<l Motion to Dismiss. Consequently, 
the only matfrt h<-fore the Court was whether the com-
plaint ih;elf was suffiei<~nt to constitute a cause of action. 
This case rn nst lw <lPt<,rrnined by the allegations of the 
complaint and not hy anythi,ng dehor the record herein. 
In sn<>h eat-\PS, this Collrt has repeatedly held that the 
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trial Judge must view the Complaint as though all alle-
gations therein could be proven as true, and should not 
i1ass upon proof which may or may not be produced later 
in snpport of those allegations. Liquor Control Commis-
sion v. Atlas, 121 Utah 457, 243 P. 2d 441 [1952] 
B. The Complaint sets forth a caitse of action 
ar;ain..;;t thr Respondents for taking the Appellants' prop-
1 1ty without a hraring and without the payment of just 
compensation: Count II of the Appellants' Complaint 
alleg<'S that the Appellants had been using 300 North 
:--;treet in Clearfield, Utah for a period of six years 
hefore the Respondents commenced the construction of 
tlie highway facilities. 300 North Street runs in an east 
and west direction directly in front of the Appellants' 
}JrO]Jerty. The Appellants allege this street provided the 
only means whereby the Appellants could drive onto 
their property and could leave their property. Count II 
further states that the Appellants had constructed a 
drin~way on their property and have been using 300 
North Street together with the driveway since 1959 as 
tlw only means of access to and from the property. 
'i1hP Complaint states that after six years of established 
use and in 1963, the Respondents erected a fence across 
;300 North Street and further erected a guardrailing near 
tlw f!'nce which cut off the use of 300 North Street by 
the Appellants. Count II further alleges that the Re-
spondents have agreed to rebuild and realign the Appel-
lants' driveway but the Respondents would not pay any 
<lamages for the loss in market value because of the 
n'locakd driveway. Count II asks for $8,000 damages 
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for lmn>rinµ; tlw fair rnarkd vahw of Appellants' prop-
erty and Count ] Tl asks for an injunction against the 
Hespondents pren•nting them from proceeding further 
with the constnwtion of Interstate 15 until they fill 300 
Korth 8tn'd and n·move the f rnce and guardrail across 
300 :North Stn•(•t, tlu•rl'hy allffwing the Appellants access 
to tlwir pro1wrty and the peaceable use and occupancy 
thereof. 
The> earliest Utah easP which holds that the ownPr 
of property abutting a public street has a property 
right in thf' str<>d ihwlf is Dooly Block v. Salt Lake 
Rapid Tru11sit Cumpa11y, 9 Utah 31, 33 Pac. 229 (1893). 
Jn Dooly, Ralt Lake City had granh•d a franchise to tlw 
Salt Lake City Hailroad Company to install additional 
railroad tracks on a pnblic street known as 2nd South 
Rtn·et in Halt Lake City, Utah. The Appellants owned 
<'t'rtain lots abutting 2nd South Street. They contended 
they were entitled to the free unobstructed use of the 
street as a nwans of access to their property. They 
alleged that by rPason of thP "Several uses with which 
it (2nd South) had been burdened, the ordinary use 
thereof for public tran·I and ingress and egrPss to the 
S(:'Veral premisl•s had become impeded and embarrassed." 
On pag(> 37 of tl1P l' tah R<>ports the Court held as fol-
lows: 
''It follows that, when land is plotted by the 
owrn'rs of tile soil, and lob; sold, bounded by a 
street dPsignated on thP plat, the grantee acquires 
a right to the street in front of the preniises as 
a means of access. [Citations omitted] Nor doPs 
it matt<>r in this ca:-;<· that tlw fep is in the city 
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in trust for the use for the public, instead of in the 
abutting owner in trust for street purposes. 
Equally in both cases, the abutting owners are 
entitled to the use of the street as a means of 
acces~ to their lots. . . . If the fee is in the city, 
the nghts of the abutter are in the nature of 
equitable easements in fee; if in the abutter, they 
are in their nature legal. In either case, the 
abutters have the right to have the street kept 
open and not obstructed so as to interfere with 
their easements and materially diminish the value 
of their property. When the lots of the plaintiffs 
·were sold under the town-site act, above men-
tioned, it was in effect, agreed with the grantees 
that they were entitled to the use of the street 
as a means of ingress, egress, light, and air. These 
rights were inducements to purchasers, became a 
part of the purchase, are appurtenances to the 
land which cannot so embarrassed or abridged as 
to materially interfere with its proper use and 
enjoyment and they are in effect, property of 
which the owners cannot be deprived withoitt due 
compensation. 
"Counsel for appellant contend that, subject to 
special constitutional restrictions, the legislature 
has plenary power over all public ways and 
streets. If this position be tenable, then, in the 
absence of special constitutional restrictions, the 
legislature may authorize municipalities to de-
vote the entire width of a street to railroad pur-
poses, regardless of the property rights of abut-
ting owners without compensation to injury to 
the property. This theory does not appear to be 
sustained by the authorities. The legislature may 
delegate power over streets to municipalities, but 
in doing so it must recognize the property rights 
of a private individual ... 
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"[Pagt• 41 l 1-1lu• full conception of the trne nature· 
of a irnblic strPd in a city as rt>spects the right of 
the puhlir on the one hand and the rights of the 
adjoining own<>r on the other has been slowl.v 
evolved from 1·xperience. It has been only at a 
recent period in our legal history that these two 
distind rights have separate!~· and in their rela-
tions to each other, come to be understood and 
defined with precision. The injustice to the abut-
ting owner arising from the exercise of unre-
strained and legislative powers over streets in 
citie:- "'Pre such that the abutter necessarily 
songht legal redress, and the discussion thenc<' 
ensuing led to a more careful ascertainment of 
the nature of streets and of the rights of tlw 
adjoining owner in respect thereof. It would 
seem that he had, in common with the rest of the 
public of right of passage bitt it was also further 
seen that he had rights not shared by the pul>lic 
at large, speci.al and pecitliar to himself, and 
which arose out of the relation of his lot to the 
street in fro11t of it; and that these rights, u'hether 
tl1e lHtrr fee of the street was i11 the lot owner or hi 
the city, wrre rights of property, and as s11cl1. 
011ght to lJf', a11d were, sacred from, legislative i11-
1iasio11 as his right to the lot itself." [Emphasis 
Added] 
rrlH· Dooly ea:-w was d(·rid<>tl in 1893 whieh was 
before the Constitnt ional ConvPntion and before Utah 
be>come a stat(>. HO\n•v<T the fnndanwntal propert_v con-
eqlts <'xpn•ss<•d in t1w Dooly case W('rt' very carefully 
considen•d h:-· th<~ d<>IPgatPs to the Constiutional Con-
YPntion as n·<·ord(·d in tlH· minutPs of said convention. 
'l'hPsP minnfrs an· se>1 fortl1 lwreinafter in this brief. 
lt "\ms el<'ar that not onl:-· did t1H~ delegates to the Con-
stitutional ('01iy(·1itio11 mrnt to prot(>d, the rights of 
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pro1wrty owners who owned lots abutting public streets, 
hut the 8upreme Court of the State of Utah also recog-
niztc•d these rights after the Constitntional Convention. 
In the case of Morris v. The Oregon Shortline Rail-
road Company, 36 Utah 14, 102 Pac. 629 (1909), the 
Plaintiff brought an action to recover damages as an 
abutting mvner of certain property arising by reason 
of the construction and operation of a certain railroad 
in a public stret in Salt Lake City. The trial judge found 
that the property owner had a right in the public street 
\Yhich ought to be protected pursuant to Article 1 Sec-
tion 22 of the Utah Constitution. The Supreme Court 
stated in part as follows: 
"[Page 17 Utah Reports] The theory adopted by 
the trial court was that an action by an abutting 
owner for damages to his property occasioned by 
the construction and operation of a commercial 
railroad in a public street in front of his property 
by which ingress and egress to and f ram the 
property is impeded, and the uses otherwise di-
rectly affected, comes within the provision of 
Section 22 Article 1 of our Constitution which 
reads: 'Private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensa-
tion.' That an owner of property, which abuts 
on a public street, has sitcli a property right in the 
street that he may in a proper action, recover 
damages for an interference with such right, when 
sitcli inter[ erence directly affects his property, is 
too well settled by authorities to reqitire further 
discussion. Nor are the elements which may be 
considered in determining the damages to the 
property owner longer open to consideration. In 
such an action, everything which arises out of 
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the proper construction and proper operation of 
the railroad which directly affects the saleable 
valw:' of the abutting property may ordinaril~· 
be eonsider<'d as elements in assessing damages. 
Many things are usually taken into consideration 
in such actions, which would not giv(' risP to 
an independent action ,and in such a case all th(' 
damages are assessed as constituting a single 
cause of action, and the measure of such damages 
is fop amount that the property has depreciated 
in market value. This is amply illustrated by 
the authorities. [citations omitted] Such an action 
is no different in principal from an action for 
damages to the remaining property where a part 
only is condemned. The easement the abutting 
ow11er has in the street is a property right, and an 
interfcrrnce with this right is, to the extent of 
the interference, deemed a, taking of property for 
which, if snch taking directly injures the abidting 
property, as a foresaid, the owner may recover 
dmnag<'s.·· [Emphasis added] 
Tlw Dooly easr and the lJI orris case clearly show 
that tlw abutting jH'Operty ownPr has a property right in 
the sfrl'ef and tlw State of Utah cannot construct im-
provemenh; in or aeross tlw public street where the 
affect of thi:-; constnwtion is to interfere with or impede 
thP ahntting property owner in his use of the street as 
a means of ingn'ss arnl egress to his property. The two 
casPs cited clearly slmw that thr property owner is 
protectrd h.'· ArtielP l Nection ~2 of the Utah Constitu-
tion. 
TlwsP th(•ori('s of lH'O}lPl't)' rights W€~re also again 
n:'affirrn<'d h.'· tlt(' Utah Nt1pn·mt· Court in a case de-
eided in 1 !H;:~. l 'fol1 lluud Co111111ission v. Hansen, 14 U. 
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2<1 :)05, 309, :183 P. 2d 917 (1963). In Hansen the Utah 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding in Dooly Block, 
and although recognizing that the facts in Dooly and 
If anse n were different the court did say: 
'' 'vVe are aware that in the case of Dooly Block v. 
Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co. this court stated that 
an owner whose property abuts an established 
public street had an easement of access thereto, 
and we agree where such is taken it woitld consti-
tute the taking of property covered by our emi-
nrnt domain statute. It should be kept in mind 
that the Dooly case dealt with an established 
easement and whether such a right of access could 
t>xist in the absence of an established use was 
not considered." [Emphasis Added] 
rl'liil'l holding reaffirms Dooly if an established easement 
ean lw shown. In the instant case it is clear the Appel-
lants had mwd the public street [300 North Street] since 
l 9;)7 and comwquently, would have a six year "estab-
l i~l1Pd USP." 
The next case dealing with these matters was State 
{;y State Road Conunission, ct al, v. District Coitrt, 
Fourth Judicial District, 94 Utah 384, 78 P. 2d 502 
(1937). This was an action by certain property owners 
to <'njoin tlw state road commission and its individual 
1i1Prnlwrs from constructing a viaduct along a portion 
of Center Street in Provo City. The Plaintiffs sought 
m1 in;jnnction until the Defendants would start eminent 
domain proceedings. The statement of facts on page 
;J04 of t}w Pacific Report is set out in part as follows: 
"That this construction [of the viaduct in Center 
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Stn·L·tj ·will deprivl~ the Plaintiffs of the prest>nt 
conYenilmt accPss to their property ... will cause 
the grade of the street to be raised in front of 
their vropnties; and will prevent continuous 
travel on Center Street past the properties of tlw 
Plaintiffs except oyer the proposed viaduct ... 
that the threatened acts of the Defendants, if not 
enjoined by Court, constitute a taking of damag-
ing the Plaintiff's property; that the Defendant, 
Road Commission, has not instituted any condem-
nation proceedings; that if such construction is 
proCL'<'ded with, the Plaintiffs will have no remedy 
at law ... and unless an injunction is issued the 
Plaintiffs will haYe no remedy and ·will suffer 
frreparahle injuries." 
These allegations an· essentially the same as set forth 
in the Complaint 111 the instant case. The Attorney Gen-
eral argned that the injunction suit was in reality a suit 
ugainst tlte State of Utah and the State had not con-
sentNl to lH.· s1wd i11 such a case. rrlie Supreme Court 
agrc~c·d witlt this tiosition and held that the Statt~ Road 
Con11nissi011 eonld not he s1wd. However, it then went 
on to diseuss the liahility of the individual members of 
the rnad con1111isl-'ions and held that they could be en-
joined: 
"Can thP injunction suit be maintained against 
the contractor -or against the individual mem-
bers of the mad commission - where the affect 
of a restraining ord0r, if issued, will be to coerce 
the state into paying Defendants damages or to 
temporaril)· or IJermanently preYPnt the State 
from carrying out thP proposed highway imprnYe-
ment '?" 
Tlw S1q>r<>11H· Conrt held that Article 1 Section 22 
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of the Utah Constitution was self executing and that 
jt prohibited the State from taking private property 
wjthont just compensation. It cited the Dooly cause 
supra and held as follows: 
"[Page 507]. This court [in Dooly] having up-
held the right of an abutting owner to enjoin the 
construction or operation of a railroad in a public 
street where condemnation proceedings have not 
been taken, vvill an injunction be proper to re-
strain a contractor or members of a public com-
mission from constructing a viaduct upon a public 
street or highway where no condemnation proceed-
ings have been instituted~ . . . We are of the 
opinion that where private property is takC'n or 
damaged for public use, as is alleged in the Com-
plaint in the injunction suit, without any agree-
ment with the owner for compensation, and 
u·ithoitt auy proceedings for assessment in the 
manner provided by the Statide relating to emi-
11rnt domain, a coitrt of eqitity may properly take 
jiirisdiction where the only remedy remaining to 
the landowners is to present a claim to the Board 
of Examiners ... " [Emphasis added] 
"[Page 508] It must be remembered that we are 
here dealing with a right expressly reserved to 
the citizen in the State Constitution: 'Private 
property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation.' Article 1 Section 
22. In Section 26 of the same Article vYe read: 
'rrhe provisions of this constitution are manda-
tory and prohibitory, unless by express words 
they are declared to be otherwise.' Again we are 
told in Section 11 of Article 1: 'All courts shall 
he open and every person, for an injury done to 
him in his person, property, or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
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administered without denial or unncessary delay.' 
''"'<>think it rlPar that the framers of tlH' consti-
tution did not intend to give the rights granted 
bY Section 22, and then leave the citizen powerless 
t~ enforce such rights. We hold that this is so 
"\d1ether the injury complained of by the Plain-
tiffa in the injunction suit is considered a 'taking' 
of property or a 'damaging' of property. The 
framers of the fimdamental law, after mitch de-
batP and carefitl consideration of the hardship 
of the old rule which allowed compensation only 
in the case of rt taking of property, wrote into the 
constitution a provision by which we think they 
intended to guarantee to the landowner whose 
property is damaged just compensation with the 
same certainty as to the landowner whose prop-
erty is physically taken." [Emphasis Added] 
It is obvious from thes<-> citations that the Utah Su-
prmw C'omt in 1907 corr<·etl.'· intl•rpreted the intent of 
the deh'gatP8 to the Constitntional Convention. That is, 
that the words "or damage" "\Vert> put into the Utah 
Constitution to prp\·ent the stat<-> from constructing high-
ways and otht>r improvernt"nts whieh depreciated the 
fair market vah1e of an owner's property as much as if 
his land had hePn actuall.'· tak<-'n. 1-'his is clearl.'· in line 
with tht> discus8ions whieh took place in the Constitu-
tional Convention as set fo1,th hereinafter. The Fourth 
Di::drict Court cas<> rontinues as follows: 
"[PagP 598] However, without further argument 
as to whether there is in the case at bar, a "tak-
. " "d . ,, f' d f d t' t mg or a amagrng o e en an s pro1wr y, W<' 
hold that the Road Commissioners are not au-
tlwrized to c itli er take or dmnage the citi.zen 's 
proz1ert.11 11'itho11t the proceeding as zJrovided by 
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law for assessment of his damages. Therefore, 
when suit is brought to enjoin the contractor, or 
the road commissioners as individuals for viola-
tion of the constitution right, the injunction 
should be granted, unless the State Road Commis-
sion submits to a hearing in the manner pro-
vided by law upon the questions of the landowner's 
damages. We do not believe that the Constitution 
intends that the court shall decide in advance 
whether there is a damage "amounting to a tak-
ing" and refuse the injunction in case the damage 
is found to be less than enough to constitute a 
"taking" of the property. Infinite confusion re-
sitlts from such a rule. One court will consider 
that any substantial damage to property consti-
tutes a taking of property while others may hold 
that nothing short of damage which will render 
the property wholly useless amounts to a taking. 
[Emphasis Added] 
It 1\·ill tlms he seen that the Utah Supreme Court 
1H·ld that thP individual members of the State Road 
Commission could be enjoined from commencing the con-
strnction of a proposed public improvement until emi-
nent domain proceedings were commenced. The Supreme 
Court lias followed this rationale and has allowed in-
.innctions against individual members of the State Road 
( 'ornmission and has also allowed injunctions against 
tht' Stah' of Utah itself or its political subdivisions when 
<·ngaged in a governmental function. See Hjorth v. Whit-
f r'nlmrg, ] 21 Utah 324, 241 P. 2d 907 (1952); Shaw v. 
iC..'alt Lake Comity, 119 Utah 50, 224 P. 2d 1037 (1950); 
Frank 0 Reeder v. Brigham City, 17 Utah 2d 398, 413 
P. 2d 300 (19G6). Se also 18 AmJnr. 788, 815, 888 and 
43 ALR 2d 1072. 
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C. Tl11 Com11lai11t does set forth a cau0e of action 
against the Hr sz)()11(fr1its herein on the groitnds of negli-
ff<'Jlf nmsfr11ctio11 uctivities: In Count I of the Com-
plant, tlw Appl'llants alh,ge ownership of private prop-
ert:· and eonstrnetion of a highway adjacent thereto. In 
this Count, the Appellants emphasize the negligent, care-
h·ss, and reckles::; manner in which the highways was 
eonstruded. Thc>:· allege that their private property 
,,·as harnwd in a special way not shared by other mem-
lwrs of the comimmity. This special harm was caused 
by Yihration from ht•avy equipment operation; from ex-
ct·ssiY(' amounts of dust which have been deposited on 
their propert~·; from t•xcessive noise; by cracking in the 
'':alls and ceilings of their home; and for other reasons. 
They allege that they were damaged in the amount of 
$S,000 becallse of this negligent action. They further 
allPg<' jn tlH' Complaint in Count II thereof that a written 
claim was submitt<>d to the Utah Department of High-
wa.,·s in D1•cemlwr JD(i~, and that this claim was rejected 
on August 20, 19G-I-, l1>T said Department. In paragraph 
4 of Count II the Plaintiffs also allege that the action 
of the Drfen<lants jn erecting the fence and guardrail 
wm; can•1ess, rn•gligent, and reckless, and was not re-
quirt>d in thP pnhlie interest. The substance of this alle-
gation is that the Ddendants were negligent in designing 
the freeway strndur1· itself and it could have been 
loeated on a11otlwr pi1·ee of property, or in another way 
'd1iel1 would not tah' and/or damagP Appellant's prop-
ert~·, and that ndnal darnagP was done to appellant's 
honw dnri11µ: eonstntdion. 
On .1 nl:· I, 1 %Ii, 111<· Ptah Oovemmental Immunity 
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Act [Section 63-30-1 et sequel, UCA-1953] became law 
in the State of Utah. At this time the legislature waived 
sovereign immunity as to certain injuries. Section 63-30-6 
waives governmental immunity in all suits for the re-
tovery of any property real or personal or for the pos-
session thereof or to quiet title thereto. The Appellants 
submit that their Complaint deals with the peaceable 
recovery and possession of their property rights in 300 
North Stree>t, as those property rights are more fully 
described in the Utah Cases cited hereinafter. Further-
more, Section 63-30-10 waives immunity for injuries 
cansed by negligent acts. The Appellants in their Com-
plaint allege damages because of the negligent acts of 
the State of Utah and its employees. Furthermore, the 
A.ppellants in their Complaint allege that the construc-
tion activities commenced in October of 1963 and that 
tlwir claim was submitted to the Respondent Utah De-
partment of Highways in December, 1963. Consequently, 
tlH' requirements of Section 63-30-13 have been met. It 
is trne that Section 63-30-12 requires a filing with the 
a ttornc>y general and the agents involved within one 
yPar, but the sheriff's return in the record herein shows 
that the Attorney General and the various state officers 
\H•re served on October 28, 1964. The Appellants submit 
this serving of the Complaint constitutes sufficient no-
tict- as required by Section 63-30-12. 
The Appellants submit that the governmental im-
munity act waives immunity from suit and actions such 
as set forth in the Complaint herein. It is true that the 
gon'rnmental immunity act did not take effect until 
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July, 1966; howeYer, the Appellants contend that the 
Complaint alleges a continuing damage and injury to 
their property which persisted from October, 1963, to 
the present time. They have alleged faulty design and 
construction of the fenee and guardrail, and negligence 
in locating the fence and guard rail which amounts to a 
taking of the Appellants' property. This taking persisted 
after July 1, 1966, and the Appellants would have a right 
to institute an action at the present time for this injury. 
The Appellants submit that they should not have to be 
put to a multiplicity of suits especially where they have 
alleged a continuing trespass. This theory of a con-
bnuing trespass. This theory of a continuing trespass 
as sufficient grounds for injunctive relief was upheld 
by the Supreme Court in the case of Shaw v. Salt Lake 
Coiinty) 119 Utah 50, ~24 P. 2d 1037 (1950). 
In addition to the Governmental Immunity Act, Sec-
tion 27-12-10 UCA-1953 as amended in 1963 provides 
as follows: 
"Authority of conunission to settle claims - the 
commission [State Road Commission] is given 
authority to settle all claims not in excess of $3,000 
for each claimant arising out of accidents, damage, 
or injuries caused throngh the negligence of the 
commission, its employees, or any employees of 
the State Department of Highways in the course 
of their employment." 
Connt I of the Appl'llants' Complaint clearly is a claim 
for the negligt:·neP of the commission, its employees, and 
employees of the 8tate Department of Highways, during 
the coursP of their ernployrnf'nt in constructing Inter-
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state 15. The fact that the claim was submitted by two 
Plaintiffs for $8,000 requires, of course, an interpretation 
of this section. Admittedly, this section only gives the 
Commission authority to settle claims not in excess of 
$:-3,000 for each claimant; however, the Appellants ask 
ilw Court to interpret this provision as meaning (1) 
that a husband and wife constitute two claimants and 
consequently, the Commission has authority to com-
promise claims brought by two homeowners in the total 
nmount of $G,OOO and (2) that even though the claim 
ns originally submitted is greater than the maximum 
amount specified in 8ection 27-12-10, that the Commission 
is authorized to approve a settlement figure less than 
the amount claimed. This Section of the Utah Statutes 
c!Parly waives soverign immunity and gives the injured 
parties a right of redress against the State Road Com-
rn1ss10n even without the Governmental Immunity Act, 
:--1tpra. 
The Appellants submit that all of the foregoing 
authorities acknowledge that an owner of property which 
abuts a public street has a property right in the street for 
the purpose of ingress and egress to his lot and that any 
action by the State which interferes with this property 
right is taking and a damage contemplated by Article 1 
Sf~ction 22 of the Utah Constitution; that if the State 
refuses to commence condemnation proceedings, the land-
owner is entitled to an injunction against the individual 
members of the State Boards involved prohibiting fur-
ther construction until condemnation proceedings are 
eommenced. 
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POINT II 
EVEN IF THE COURT FINDS THAT THERE IS 
NO ACTUAL TAKING OF APPELLANTS' PROP-
ERTY, THEY ARE STILL ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
DAMAGES PURSUANT TO ARTICLE I SECTION 
22 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The Appellants snhmit there is an actual taking of 
their property rights in 300 North Street as set forth 
in the Dooly case supra, etc., and that there is a sub-
stantial damage to their remaining property not actually 
taken. Because of these allegations, the Appellants sub-
mit that they are brought squarely within the protection 
of Article 1 Section 22 of the Utah Constitution and Sec-
tions 78-34-10 ( 1) and (2) Utah Code Annotated - 1953. 
If this court should find that t1u-•re is no actual taking 
of Appellants' property, then Appellants submit there 
is still a conseqrnmtial damage which entitles them to 
compt•nsation pursuant to Article I Section 22 of the 
Gtah Constitution and especially that portion of the 
constitutional provision -which states "or damaged," and 
pnrsuant to section 78-34-10(3) UCA-1953. 
The Appellants submit that subsection 78-34-10 (3) 
was enacted hy the legislature to recognize that a prop-
('rty O\vner is to he compernmted for damages to his 
property even though no part js actually taken. If some 
land is takt>n, thPn snbsections (1) and (2) will fully 
compensatP the owner for all damages he has sustained. 
It is only wlwn no profH'l't~r is taken that subsection (3) 
must apply. OthPrwisP ,suh~wction (3) would be super-
fluous and conld he left out hecanse subsection (1) (2) 
would cover the fo'ld. 
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Subsection (3) has been discussed by the Supreme 
Court in the case of Board of Editcation of Logan City 
School District v. Jack Croft and Lucille B. Croft, 13 
1;. 2d 310, 373 P. 2d 297 (1962). 
In the Croft case, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
thi:-: subsection applied to injury that would be actionable 
at ('Ommon law as where there has been some physical 
disturbance of a right either public or private which 
the ffwner enjoys in connection with his property and 
\\'hich gives it additional value and which causes him 
to sustain a special damage with respect to his property 
in excess of that sustained by the public generally. It 
ret1uires a definite physical injury cognizable to the 
sPnses with a perceptible effect on the present market 
valne. 
In the instant case, the Appellants have alleged that 
the action of the Respondents has made it impossible for 
tli<·m to use 300 North Street as a means of ingress and 
c>,gTess to and from their property as it was being used 
formerly. They further allege that they have sustained 
a spte~cial injury not shared by other members of the 
llllhlic. Finally in Count IV they allege that Clearfield 
Cit~, has not deeded this property to the State nor has 
tltt> city abandoned or vacated the street. Consequently 
the Appellants are entitled to assert their established 
property rights in the street against an interloper such 
as the State of Utah. 
The Appellants acknowledge that since 1960 the Utah 
Snpreme Court has decided certain cases which cast 
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doubt upon the meaning of Section 78-34-10 (3) and that 
the affect of thPsP decisions has been to ignore subsec-
tion (3) and to hold that Article I Section 22 of the 
Utah Constitution is not self-executing and that a land-
owner has no rPmedy against the State if its property 
ii:; damaged hut not actually taken. Faircloitgh v. Salt 
Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P. 2d 105 (1960), 
Springville Banking v. Burton et al, 10 Utah 2d 100, 
349 P. 2d 157 (1960). 
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, supra, is perhaps 
th!:' best example of this new emphasis. In Fairclough, 
the State of Utah 'vas constructing a highway project 
adjacent to the Plaintiff's property. This project reduced 
the grade of the road about 16 feet below the owner's 
abutting land. The State of Utah did not commence 
condemnation proceedings because no part of the owner's 
property was actually taken. rrhe property owner con-
tended that by lowering the grade 16 feet he was dam-
aged jnst as much as though his property had been 
takt>n because his rights of ingress and egress were 
taken. 'The Supreme Court held that the State could 
not be sued without its consent and that the Constitu-
tional provisions to the effect that private property 
shall not he taken or damaged for public use without 
jnst compensation were not self-executing and did not 
constitute consent hy the state to be sued. 
These eases have heen followed since 1960 repeatedly 
by the trial courts in this state, and they were argued by 
counsel for the statP before ,Judge Thornley K. Swan in 
the instant case. 
26 
The Appellants submit that the instant action is 
factually different from the Fairclough line of cases 
bE>cause: 
(1) The instant case seeks an injunction whereas 
the other cases sought other extraordinary 
relief. Prior decisions allowing injunctions 
are set forth sitpra. Shaw v. Salt Lake 
County, Fourth District Court; Hjorth v. 
Whittenberg; Reeder v. Brigham City, 18 
Am. Jur. 788, 815, 888. 
(2) The instant case claims negligent action on 
the part of the state and its employees in 
constructing the highway facilities whereas 
negligent construction was not alleged in the 
Fairclough line of cases. The instanct case 
also alleges a special burden on the Appel-
lants' property not shared by the public gen-
erally which brings it within the exception 
stated in the Springville Banking Company 
case on page 158 of the Pacific Reports. 
(3) In July, 1966, the Governmental Immunity 
Act [Section 63-30 et sequel, Utah Code An-
notated - 1953] became effective and abro-
gates the doctrine of soverign immunity under 
the circumstances set forth in the Appellants' 
Complaint. The Fairclough line of cases 
pointed out that if a change was to be made 
in sovereign immunity, it should be done 
by the legislature. The Appellants submit 
that the legislature has now done this. It is 
true that the initial injury to the Appellants' 
property arose prior to July, 1966, but the 
Appellants allege a continuing damage to the 
present time. This clearly persists after the 
effective date of the Governmental Immunity 
Act. The Appellants submit this would be 
sufficient justification for the application of 
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this Act. Otherwise, the Appellants might 
have to start a new action claiming damages 
after .July, 19G6, which would result in a 
multiplicity of suits which ought not to lw 
suggested. 
Even assuming there are no differences between the 
instant case and the Fairclo,ugh line of decisions, the 
Appellants submit that this Court erred in deciding 
Fairclough, etc., and that it ignored or misinterpreted 
the provisions of subsection (3) of 78-34-10 UCA-1953. 
r:I'he Appellants further suggest that the holding of the 
Fairclo1tph case is contrary to the Constitutional intent 
as expn•ssed in Article 1 Section 22 of the Utah Con-
stitution and as the intent is reflected in the minutes 
of the Constitutional Convention. To the best of this 
writer's knowledge the discussion in the Constitutional 
Convention has never bl'en urged upon this Court in 
any of its prior decisions. The Appellants will attempt 
to show from thesP minutPs that the delegates to the 
Constitutional Conwntion placed the \vords "or dam-
aged" in the Utah Constitution to cover the very situa-
tion which existed in Fairclough v. Salt Lake County. 
The following citations are taken from the "Proceedings 
of the Constitutional Convention of 1895" a two-volume 
work which contains the minutes and discussions of the 
various constitutional provisions. 
On Page 164 of the said proceedings, Mr. Thurman 
introduced the following proposition as file No. 69: 
"Private property shall not he taken for public 
purposes without a just compensation first made, 
or secured to be made, as may he determined 
by law ... " 
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Tl1is proposition was read a second time by its title and 
rt>ferred to a cornrnitteP on preamble and bill of rights. 
Page 300 of the proceedings states that proposition 
fil<' No. 150 was referred to the committee of the whole 
to lw considered in connt>ction with the article on pre-
mnlile of the bill of hights. This proposition dealt with 
private prop<::•rty being taken for public use. Starting 
·with page 32G and going through page 345 there is a 
discnssion of these propisitions. 
Page 326 brings out that the second reading of the 
proposition was as follows: 
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged 
for public use without just compensation." 
~Ir. 'l1lrnrman moved to strike out the words "or dam-
aged." He stated that the purpose in offering this amend-
1m·nt was that it would be extremely difficult to assess 
damages and on Page 327 he goes into his reasons. 
On PagP 328 at the top of the page, l\lr. Eichnor asks 
tliat the words "or damaged" be taken out. His argu-
ltlPnt is similar to the argument of the Utah Supreme 
( 'ourt as found in Fairclough and Springville. He says: 
"Take a city like Salt Lake ·where grading is 
required or any other city where grading is re-
quired, and you will bankrupt those cities if yon 
place this in the Constitution. Every man that 
owns property in the street - the street will be 
graded and one or two or three people will claim 
damages, and the result will be it will bring the 
municipalities into court." 
Mr. Pit>rce then addressed himself to the very situations 
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covered in the Fairclough and Springville cases as a 
reason for leaYing the words "or damaged" in the Con-
stitution: 
"Mr. Chairman, I am in favor of retaining the 
words "or damaged." I recollect a spectacle a 
few years ago grading in Salt Lake City. There 
was a certain street-1 believe it was State Street 
- the grade had been established for some years 
and the city came in and established a different 
grade and built the street up some 10 feet higher 
than the property abutting it [In the Fairclough 
case the state lowered the street 16 feet lower 
than the property abutting it] There is a spectacle 
where they could not get any damage for it, and 
the street, as it was built, absolutely destroyed 
the value of the property and they could not get 
a cent for that. I say that it ought to be fixed so 
that the city must adjust the grade for the accom-
modation of people who own property along the 
certain street, and that is the reason that I am 
anxious the words "or damaged" should be left 
in. And in speaking of the remarks Mr. Varian 
made, I desire to read a line or two from Louis 
in his work upon eminent domain: 'vVhen the 
people of Illinois revised their constitution, in 
1870, they introduced an important change into 
the provision respecting the power of eminent 
domain. The provision reads as follows: 'Private 
property should not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation.' Every 
other state which has revised its constitution 
since 1870 except North Carolina - which never 
had any provision on the subject - has followed 
the example set by Illinois by adding the word 
"damaged" or its equivalent to the provision in 
question. And thP question not only refers to the 
street grades in cities hut refers to grades of 
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railroad property ... " [Reference to Fairclough 
added] 
On Page 328 Mr. Richards offers another one of the 
strongest arguments in favor of retaining tht> words 
"or damaged." 
"Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to the motion to 
strike out the words, "or damaged." I believe, as 
has been said already in this discussion that when 
the public uses a man's property or makes an im-
provement that virtually destroys the use of that 
property, that they should pay for it as much as 
if the property itself were taken. Of course, as 
has been suggested by the gentleman from Salt 
Lake, whatever benefit results by reason of this 
improvement is set off against the damage that 
it has caused, and in that way, the public gets 
absolute justice in relation to the matter. But 
to say that public corporations should be per-
mitted by the raising of a grade or the lowering 
of a grade [as was the case in Faircloitgh] or by 
any other kind of improvement to injure private 
property, and because they don't actually enter 
upon and take the property itself, although they 
do destroy the use of the property, that they 
should be liable for damage. I think it is unjust 
and unfair and I am, therefore, opposed to this 
motion." [Mention of Fairclough added] 
Two other men also spoke on this subject. Mr. Var-
ian from Salt Lake had this to say on Page 326: 
"Mr. Chairman, I am in accord with the motion 
of the gentleman to require compensation be first 
made, but it seems to me that to strike out "or 
damaged" is a very material matter. I had taken 
pains to look at it a little today in the late works 
on eminent domain and I found it was put in 
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other constitutions or statutes to meet the entire 
case. In some states, some courts have held that 
damage to property of a consequential kind was 
not necessarily within the meaning of the article 
of the Constitution. [This is exactly what Utah 
has held in the Fairclough and Springville cases.] 
For instance, I believe in Pennsylvania - may 
have confounded the state - the question arose 
-where an elevated road was erected upon the 
street and while it did not touch the property of 
the abutting owner, did not destroy a brick, did 
not take a foot of his ground, it did affect his use 
and occupancy of his premises very disastrously. 
It affected the convenience of the inhabitants of 
the house and in this, particular case following 
later, it was held that there was no remedy. There 
was not the taking of the property. That the 
courts in New York went off in another direction 
and it is finally settled in that case that such 
injury as that could be compensated under the law 
of eminent domain. To make it perfectly clear, 
this word has been put in laws and constitutions 
and the text wrifors say that it is equivalent for 
any kind of injury of that kind." [Reforence to 
Fairclough and Springville added] 
Mr. 'f1hunnan replic~d that he thought compensation 
ought to he paid hut that he thought there would be a 
lot of tronh!P in assessing consequential damages, 
whereas he didn't think these problems would exist where 
there had hen an actual taking of the property. To this 
argument, ~rr. Farr r0plied on Page 327 as follows: 
"I do not see why. rrake a case like this, it could 
he estimated there could be no subsequent change. 
There is the railroad, there is the house, and 
there are the \vimlows. There is a deprivation of 
light and air. Tl1ere are all the necessary incon-
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veniences of noise, cinders, and soot ,and disturb-
ing the peace in reference to the family. This can 
be compensated for just as well in the beginning 
as it can after a lapse of ten years. It is within 
the knowledge of man and can be deduced before 
a jury. I do not care how the gentleman does it. 
I do not wish to be technical about it. I would like 
to see those words "or damaged" kept in some 
way. I hope those words "or damaged" remain 
in that section. I do not wish to argue the point 
but I can see in a great many instances where it 
would be very important. For instance, on the 
sidewalk, a person owning land, they dig down a 
bank 10 or 15 feet and damage that lot to a great 
extent. I think the man should be remunerated 
for the damage done to his lot. I move that those 
words remain in that section if they possibly 
could remain there." 
After these discnssions, .Mr. Thurman withdrew his 
motion to d<'lde the words "or damaged" and tlH' com-
mittee adopted Article I Section 22 of the constitution 
lea ,·ing in these words. 
The discn::;sions continue to page 345 of the pro-
('<'<·dings. They then commence again on page 623 of 
tlt<· proceedings and continue through page 651. These 
latter pages refer to discussions before the Constitu-
tional Convention as a whole. These discussions center 
around possible changes that could be made to Article 1 
8ection 22; however, the committee decided against any 
changes or amendments. Each of the delegates state 
why they wanted to leave the words "or damaged" in 
the provision. 
One of the most signifieant parts of the discussion 
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before the Convention as a whole begins on page G41. 
Because this discussion involves the power of the sov-
ereign to take private property without compensation, 
it is included at this time. 
Mr. Varian began his discussion of several cases 
from the United States Supreme Court and other au-
thorities from state case law and from leading text books. 
He then quoted Mr. Justice Field of the United States 
Supreme Court as follows: 
"The power to take private property for public 
uses generally termed the right of eminent domain 
belongs to every independent government. It is an 
incident of sovereignty and as such in Boone v. 
Patterson requires no constitution or recognition. 
The provisions found in the Fifth Amendment 
to the Constitution and in the Constitutions of the 
several states for just compensation for the prop-
erty taking is merely a limitation upon the use of 
the power." 
Mr. Varian interpreted this citation as meaning that 
a state normally 1vould not need any power to be able 
to take private property because it is an incident of 
sovereignty that all states havt'. This led him to the con-
clusion that by putting a provision in the~Utah Constitu-
tion, that just compern;ation should be paid, that it would 
limit or control the power of the soverign to take or 
damage property and that the limitation is self-executing 
and that that's tht> only i·eason it's put there, i.e. to be 
a limitation which is self-Pxecnting and that it requires 
no implementing legislation. Otherwise, it could have 
been left out of the constitution all together. He goes 
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on to point out on Page 642 that the Constitutional Con-
vention could enact certain measures which amounted to 
confiscation of private property without having to pay 
just compensation if Article 1 Section 22 were not in-
c·lndt~d. 
On page 651 a roll call was taken for the entire 
Article 1 entitled "The Declaration of Rights." This 
vage shows that there were 96 affirmative votes and 
no negative votes. Page 650 shows that there were two 
members [Mr. Partridge and Mr. Thurman] who felt 
that Article 1 Section 22 should have been passed as it 
f·ame from the committee of the whole requiring that 
compensation be first made before the property was 
taken or damaged. However, neither of these gentlemen 
objected to the words "or damaged" being left in. 
It seems evident from the discussions in the Consti-
tutional Convention both in the committee and before the 
Convention itself that there was a considerable amount 
of debate as to just what the words "or damaged" meant. 
lt seems just as obvious that these words were left in 
to prevent the state of Utah from interfering with an 
abutting property owner's right of ingress and egress 
to his property by lowering or raising grades, erecting 
frnces, guide posts, etc. across public streets. N otwith-
8tanding this Constitutional Provision and all of the 
cases before and after Utah become a state, the Supreme 
Court since 1960 has held that the words "or damaged" 
in Article 1 Section 22 do not add anything to the word 
''taken", and there can be no compensation unless there 
i;-; an actual taking. The Fairclough situation was decided 
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against the property o-wner notwithstanding the fact 
that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention in-
serted the words "or damaged" to protect the property 
owner, and notwithstanding Subsection 78-24-10(3) UCA-
1953 was encated to protect the property owner. 
POINT III 
THE HOLDING OF THIS COURT THAT ARTICLE 
I SECTION 22 IS NOT SELF-EXECUTING IS CON-
TRARY TO THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF 
AUTHORITY AND IGNORES SUBSECTION 78-34-10 
(3) UCA - 1953. 
In Springville Banking Company v. Burton, supra, 
at page 171 of the Pacific Reports, the court stated in 
part as follows: 
"Now here in the J acol1s case ran be found any 
lH'onouncement to the effect that the Fifth 
Amendment, which is Pxactly like oitr Article 1 
Section 22, waived any soverign immunity or con-
stituted a consent to he sued." [Emphasis added] 
In Fairclou,r;h 'V. Salt Dake County, supra at page 107 
of the Pacific Reports, the court stated in part as fol-
lows: 
"The Fifth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution is like Article 1 Section 22 of our Con-
stitution, save for the word "damage." By no 
stretch of the imagination could this alter the 
principle involved." [Emphasis added] 
In tJwse two citations, it is obvious that the court 
decided these cases on the hasis that the Utah Constitu-
tion was exactly the same as the Federal Constitution 
and that the words "or <lamaged" in the Utah Constitu-
tion made no differenrP. The Appellants submit that 
36 
this conclusion is a mere gratuity and is contrary to 
t·wrything which was discussed by the delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention as set forth hereinabove. It 
is obvious that the words "or damaged" were put in the 
Utah Constitution to make it different from the Federal 
Constitution and to make it different from those State 
Constitutions which contain only the word "taken." By 
holding as it does, this Court has now equated the Utah 
Constitution with those states whose constitutional pro-
visions do not include the words "or damaged." In this 
onP gesture, the Supreme Court has overturned the en-
tire intent of the delegates of the Constitutional Con-
vention and has overturned the entire line of decisions 
from 1893 to 1960. This has been done without the cita-
tion of any cases to support the conclusion and without 
any reasons being given therefor, other than the state-
m<·nt that no stretch of the imagination could hold other-
wisP. The Appellants submit that the imagination of such 
an authority as Nichols on Eminent Domain has reached 
a different result, which result is based upon case cita-
tions, constitutional authority and legislative enactment 
from every state in the country having constitutional pro-
visions similar to Utah. 
In 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Third Edition, 
11ages 486-487 Section 6.44 entitled "Damage" Clause in 
the State Constitutions the author states as follows: 
"Except in the extreme northeastern section of 
the country, the state legislatures showed no 
sympathy with the concept that there was a moral 
obligation to compensate an owner of land which 
had been damaged by the construction of a public 
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improvement, and continued to authorize the exer-
cise of eminent domain, and the use of the public 
streets, for public improvements of every descrip-
tion without providing any remedy for the land-
owners other than that which the letter of the 
constitution required. It was in the rapidly grow-
ing city of Chicago that the most serious injuries 
to property by the construcfaon of public improve-
ments occurred and the attention of the people 
of that city was focused upon the hardship of the 
rule by a number of especially striking examples. 
Finally, in 1870 a constitutional amendment was 
adopted in Illinois providing that private prop-
erty should be neither taken nor damaged for 
public use without compensation. This action by 
Illinois was followed by many of the other states; 
by West Virginia in 1872, by Arkansas and Penn-
sylvania in 187 4, by Alabama, Missouri, and Ne-
braska in 1875, by Colorado and Texas in 1876, 
by Georgia in 1877, and by California and Louisi-
ana in 1879. It is now contained in the constitu-
tions of Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vir-
ginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
There is a similar provision in Iowa, applicable, 
however, only to the change of grade of highways. 
It has been said that under the constitutional 
provisions protecting an owner under a "taking" 
he is guaranteed compensation for any depreva-
tion of res, but not of .ius. It is itnder the later 
provision of thP constitution protecting an owner 
·against "damage" that a landowner may claim 
compensation for the destruction or disturbance 
of easements of light and air, and of accessibility, 
or of such other intangible rights as he enjoys 
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in connection with and as incidental to the owner-
ship of the land itself." 
1 t f'eems ohvious that tlw words "or damaged" do make 
the Utah Constitution diff Prent from the Federal Con-
stitution and state constitutions which contain only the 
word "taken." 
The AppPllants fnrther submit that the holding in 
Fairclough that "Article 1 Section 22 of the Constitu-
tion is not self-executing, nor does it give consent to be 
~ned, implied or otherwise; and that to secure such 
consent is a legislative matter, a principle recognized by 
tlw legislature itself .... " [354 P. 2nd 106] is contrary 
to the overwhelming weight of authority. 
In 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Third Edition, 
498 Section 6.441 [4] Damage clause is self-executing, 
the author defines the words self-executing to mean: 
"That is, if the legislature authorizes the con-
struction of a public work which may injuriously 
affect neighboring property and fails to provide 
a special procedure for ascertaining or recovering 
damages, the statute authorizing the work is not 
treated as unconstitutional but the owner of the 
injured property is allowed to recoved his dam-
ages in an ordinary civil action." 
This is clearly ·what the delegates to the Constitutional' 
Convention meant the Utah Constitutional provisions to 
be, that is to be self-executing and to protect property 
owners against unlawful interference by state agencies. 
Furthermore, it is obvious that in the case of Emi-
nent Domain, tlw legislature has provided a special pro-
cedure for ascertaining or recovering damages when no 
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property is actually taken but when the land is only 
damaged in a consequential manner. This legislative 
enactment is expressly found in Section 78-34-10 (3) 
UCA - 1953. Consequently, even if the Utah Constitu-
tion is held not to be self-executing, there is a provision 
supplied by the legislature in subsection (3) which does 
make it executing as to consequential damages. It 
appears the Fairclough decisions have ignored this pro-
vision of the Utah 8tatutes. 
Finally, the Appellants submit that the holding of 
the Fairclough decision that the constitutional provision 
is not self-executing is contrary to the overwhelming 
weight of authority. In every state which the writer of 
this brief has analyzed having constitutional provisions 
similar to Utah's and containing the word "damage" it 
appears that all of these states save Utah and possibly 
New Mexico and Pennsylvania, hold that the constitu-
tional provisions are either self-executing or that conse-
quential damages can be allowed for interference with 
the right of ingress and egress. [Arizona - Article II 
~17; Coimty of Mohave v. Chamberlin, 78 Ariz. 422, 281 1 
P. 2d 128, 133, ( 1955). Arkansas - Article II § 22; 
Dickenson v. Okolona, 98 Ark. 206, 135 S.W. 863 (1911). 
California - Article I § 14; Bacich v. Board of Control 
of California, 23 C. 2d 343, 144 P. Td 818 (1944) see also 
Rose v. State, 105 P. 2d 30:2, 310, (1940) affirmed on re-
hearing, 19Cal. 2d 713, 123 P. 2d 505 (1942). Colorado -
Article II§ 15; Board of Commissioners of Logan County 
v. Adler, 69 C. 290, 194 P. 621 (1920). Georgia - Article 
I § 3, Pause v. City of Atlanta, 26 S. E. 489 (1896); 
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.11<'..wnder rt al v. City Coimcil of Augusta et al, 68 S. E. 
704: ( 1910). Illinois - Article II § 13; People ex rel 
Jlan,r1naff i-. Rosenfield, 383 Ill. 468, 50 N.E. 2d 479 
(1943); Proplc ex rel vVanless V. City of Chicago, 378 
Ill. 453, 38 N. E. 2d 743 (1942); City of Chicago v. George 
F. Jfardi11g Collection, 70 Ill. App. 2d 254, 217 N. E. 2d 
mn (1966). lllinncsota -Article I§ 13; Dickerman v. 
Cit !J of Duluth, 88 :Minn. 288, 92 N. W. 119 (1903); Aus-
tin 'IJ. Hen11epin County, 130 Minn. 359, 253 N. W. 738 
( 1915). JJhssissippi - Article III § 17; Parker v. State 
Hi,r17iwuy C01nmission, 173 M. 213, 162 So. 162 (1935). 
!II issouri - Article II § § 20 & 21; Bohanon v. Camden 
Rend Drainage District, 240 Mo. App. 492, 208 S. W. 2d 
794 (1948); Page 1:. Metropolitan St. Loiiis Sewer Dist., 
377 8. W. 2d 348 (sup. 1964); Hickman v. City of Kansas, 
25 8. W. 225 (1894). Montana - Article III § 14; Eby 
r. City of Lewiston, 55 M. 113, 173 P. 1163 (1918); Less 
1.·. City of Bitttc, 28 M. 27, 31, 72 P. 140 (. ....... ). Ne-
uraska -- Article I § 21; Gentry v. State, NY Neb. 515, 
l rn N. W. 2d 643 (1962); Omaha & R.U.R.R. Co. v. 
Standen, 22 Neb. 343, 35 N. W. 183 (1887). New Mexico 
- Article II § 20 (no cases) North Dakota - Article 
r § 14 lllayer v. Studen N Manion Co., 66 N.D. 190, 262, 
N. \V. 925 (1935); Chandler v. Hjelle, 126 N. W. 2d, 
141 (1964). Oklahoma - Article II§§ 23 & 24; Missouri, 
K&T.R. Co. v. State, 167 Okl. 23, 229 P. 172 (1924). 
Texas - Article I§ 17; Crnig v. City of Dallas, 20 S. W. 
2d 154 (1929); Powell v. Hoi,ston & T.C.R. Co., 104 & 
21H, 135 S. \V. 1153 (1911). Virginia - Article IV§ 58; 
Swift & Co. v. Newpost News, 105 Va. 108, 1131 52 S. E. 
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821 (1906). Washington - Article I§ 16; State ex rel 
Spokane, P.&S.R. Co. v. Y ellc, 199 vVash. 70, 90 P. 2d 
263 (1939). West Virginia - Article III§ 9; Javins v. 
City of Dunhar, 110 Vv. Ya. 271, 157 S. E. 586 (1931); 
Thorne v. Clarkshung, 88 W. Va. 251, 106 S. E. 644 
(1921). Wyoming -Article I§§ 32 & 33; Hirt v. Casper, 
56 Wyo. 57, 103 P. 2d 394 (1940)]. 
For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully 
submitted that the Appellants' Complaint does state a 
cause of action against the State of Utah, and the indi-
vidual members of the State Road Commission, that 
the decision of Judge Thornley K. Swan was contrary to 
the law jn the State of Utah, and is contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of authority as set forth herein. 
For these reasons it is respectfully requested that the 
decision of Judge Swan be reversed, that the motion to 
dismiss be denied, and that this case be remanded to the 
trial judge so that theAppellants may have a complete 
trial uvon the issues presented in their Complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES A. McINTOSH 
Attorney for Appellants 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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